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The beauty of Waikiki did not mask the struggles of the island. What struck
me were the moments of recognition about the nature of the struggles as I have
experienced elsewhere in post-colonial settings outside of the United States, most
recently Guatemala. Guatemala was present in my mind as I took in the island. I
was there to present a talk at the Society of American Law Teachers ("SALT")

* Professor of Law and Director of the Inter-American Program at University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law.
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Teaching Conference on indigenous mining struggles in Guatemala.' My
Guatemalan husband-who had just returned from a SALT human rights
delegation in Guatemala and was being particularly Guatemalan in his inquiries
about the island-added to my comparative fixation. But honestly, the
comparison was easy and unsettling. Eric Yamamoto's exhortation during the
conference's opening plenary about Native Hawaiians' land struggles was
perhaps an obvious beginning.2 Also similar was the stress on our purse as we
struggled to spend less on the island for basic things such as food; a practice we
would continue even after leaving Waikiki, in search of "local" spaces. Hawaii
does not grow much of its food anymore,3 and I confessed to Luis, my husband,
that I was afraid for Guatemala's food-production destiny in a world of U.S. farm
subsidies and CAFTA.4 Later, Tagi, a Fijian local friend, took us on a journey to
buy locally grown food, a huge commitment of both time and money. We drove
for a while along the North Shore's beauty, past pineapple and macadamia fields.
Tagi and her partner Christine, talked about community gardening as an
alternative, and I smiled with sadness as I recalled a conversation with an
environmental activist in Guatemala, Yuri Melini: "Nosotros acd en Guatemala le
proveemos el desayuno a los gringos; mel6n, bananas, y caf6; mientras la
mayorfa nos quedamos sin comer."5 The day before we left, after spending a
week on the island, I jokingly told my husband: "Let's leave this island before
we go broke." Suddenly, the mass displacement of Native Hawaiians to Las
Vegas, where I lived for a decade, made personal sense to me,6 as does the mass
migration of Mayan farmers to the United States.7 Similarly, I recognized and
understood the Filipino faces in the immigrants of Honolulu, who cleaned our
hotel room, who had elevated themselves from a desperate situation to only
trying conditions for survival.8 And I laughed a little, in resignation, as I bought

1. I was part of a panel of Pacific McGeorge professors titled Localizing the Global: Social Justice,
CorporateResponsibility and Sustainability Perspectivesin U.S. Legal Education.
2. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS
AMERICA 120-21 (1999).
3. See HAW. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REPORT ON FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY INHAWAI'I 3-4 (2008).
4. See generally J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31870, THE U.S.-CENTRAL AMERICA
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA): CHALLENGES FOR SUB-REGIONAL INTEGRATION (2004).
5. "Here in Guatemala, we provide Americans their breakfast; melon, bananas and coffee; while the
majority of us are left hungry."
6. See, e.g., Joseph Pimentel, Asian-Americans Yet to Be Seen as Political Force, ASIAN J. (Jan. 18, 2008,
12:17 PM), http://asianjoumal.wordpress.com2008/0 1/18/asian-americans-yet-to-be-seen-as-political-force/.
7. See generally Alejandro Portes, La nueva naci6n latina: inmigraci6ny la poblaci6n hispana de los
Estados Unidos [The New Latin Nation: Immigration and the Hispanic Populationof the United States], 116
REVISTA ESPAIROLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOL6GICAS 55 (2006), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/

40184808.
8. Many workers in Hawaii must work two jobs to make ends meet. See, e.g., Why Do so Many People
Leave Hawaii?, ETURBO NEWS (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.eturbonews.com/20437/why-do-so-many-peopleleave-hawaii. One of our housekeepers was back to work two months after birthing her fourth child.
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"made in El Salvador" Hawaiian t-shirts and "made in China" Hawaiian relics, to
bring a little bit of "Hawaii" home.
This essay is not about Hawaii, but about the teaching and learning lessons it
left with me in the few meaningful days I spent there with my colleagues and its
people. The first lesson relates to the importance of comparative perspectives on
lessons for social justice. This comes from the simple Hawaiian-made realization
about the shared commonality of how the poor and indigenous communities
experience the brunt of globalization, particularly in the context of postcolonization. In this essay, I explore how the poor indigenous communities in
Guatemala have experienced Canadian Mining. To the local Mayan communities
of San Miguel Ixtahuac~n and Sipacapa, global strategies and norms have
inevitably shaped their daily struggles for cultural cohesiveness and
sustainability, as they encounter transnational actors and forces. These struggles
have radically transformed these communities, and their plight offers broader
lessons to other communities faced with similar struggles.
The second lesson I explore in this essay relates to the importance of
conscious, personal experiences in learning social justice. Personally, Honolulu
transformed my relationship to Hawaii and influenced my reflection in this piece.
Admittedly, I was transformation-prone. Bill Hing said it best during the lunch
panel on Rebellious Lawyering at the SALT Teaching Conference, when he
9
confessed the inevitability for him to see everything through a racial lens. This
critical lens Bill described is one that many of us, concerned with social justice,
have developed throughout our lives; and hopefully it is one that we seek to
perfect and nurture as lawyers dedicated to social change. If you think back,
those developmental moments most likely came from personal experiences
directly, or through connection with the human struggles of others and their
efforts to overcome. If we are to challenge the way we perceive and feel the
world, transformative learning cannot be detached from experiences;' nor can
meaningful learning about social justice be separate from social struggles. As law
professors, many of us come to teach, committed to the creation of equivalent
meaningful opportunities for our students. Thus, in this essay, I also reflect on the
opportunities for transformative learning experienced by some of our students at
Pacific McGeorge, who have traveled to Guatemala to work with local human
rights groups in their struggles for environmental justice.
The decision by Pacific McGeorge to start a program in Guatemala was quite
intentional but not an easy one." My colleagues and I rightly worried about
9. The lunch panel was titled Teaching Rebellious Lawyering.
10. For an explanation of what I mean by transformative teaching and learning, see Raquel Aldana &
Leticia Saucedo, Learning in Mulukuka: A Journey of Transformation, in VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND
TRANSFORMATIVE LAW TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 251 (Soc'y of Am. Law Teachers & Golden Gate
Univ. Sch. of Law eds., 2010).
11. The Guatemala program is part of our Inter-American Program, a unique law program designed to
graduate bilingual and inter-cultural competent lawyers to represent Latino clients in the United States or work
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safety; 2 yet, Guatemala offered meaningful opportunities for the type of deep
learning about transnational social struggles for justice I hoped to encourage in
law students.'3 Like Hawaii, Guatemala has a rich culture and natural wealth and
beauty,' 4 yet Guatemala's social struggles are fierce and daunting. 5 At its twentyfifth anniversary of signing the peace agreement to end a civil war that lasted
thirty-five years,16 it is hard sometimes to recognize progress. The country
remains one of the most unequal in the world in terms of wealth distribution 7 and
the nation's commitment to social programs is shamefully weak, despite
alarming degrees of poverty.'" And yet, Guatemala is also a land of tremendous
opportunity for democratic and economic development, where public or private
transnational actors have invested time and resources that have transformed the
nation, even in its most local spaces.' 9 This transformation, while perhaps
inevitable, necessary, and sometimes even beneficial, introduces new conflicts
and challenges to issues of governance, legal development, economic
sustainability, and cultural cohesion.20
Transnational mining in Guatemala is one example of how the convergence
of the local and global has divided a nation, introduced new powerful actors,
changed power dynamics, and reshaped strategies for social justice. 2' To some,
on transnational issues in Latin America. For more information, visit our website at Inter-American Program,
UNIV. OF THE PAC., PAC. MCGEORGE SCH. OF L., http://www.mcgeorge.edu/AcademicPrograms/Inter-

AmericanProgram.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
12. Background Note: Guatemala, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (July 27, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/2045.htm.
13. Id.
14. For example, indigenous people in Guatemala are the majority of the population. Guatemala has twentythree language groups with fifty-two distinct languages. Id.; Acts 1:8: Challenge in Guatemala and Ukraine, ALSBOM,
http://www.alsbom.org/clientimages/36469/publications-and-pdfs/Acts-1-8-Guatemala-Ukraine.pdf (last visited Oct.
21,2011).
15. Beatriz Manz & Amy Ross, U.N. Peace-Building in Guatemala, 8 PEACE REV. 529 (1996).
16. Id.
17. Luis Alejandro Alejos, Contribution of the Determinants of Income Inequality in Guatemala,
UWCAD 5 (Oct. 2003), http://www.uwcades.org/papers/alejos2003.pdf; see also Guatemala: Poverty and
Wealth, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.comleconomies/Americas/
Guatemala-POVERTY-AND-WEALTH.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
18. For example, social investment in Guatemala in education and health remains one of the lowest in
the world. See At a Glance: Guatemala, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guatemalastatistics.html#69 (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). In addition, resistance to tax reform in the country is intractable
and the state can barely collect eleven percent. See Luis Pasara, The Guatemala Peace Process: The Accords
and Their Accomplishments, CIAO 10 (Dec. 2001), http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/pal0 l/pal0.pdf.
19. Mercy Corps, USAID and Wal-Mart Forge Alliance for Guatemalan Farmers, INCLUSIVE MKT.
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENTREPRENEURS (Mar. 5, 2008), http://guatemala.usembassygov/uploads/wO/iG/
wOiGZjqpJvnx OVob-eNFQ/IMAREReleaseEng.pdf [hereinafter Mercy Corps].
20. See infra Parts I & I.
21. Simon V. Yagenova & Rocio Garcia, Indigenous People's Struggles Against Transnational Mining
Companies in Guatemala: The Sipakapa People vs GoldCorp Mining Company, J. OF THE RES. GROUP ON
SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY ONLINE, http://sdonline.org/5 1/indigenous-people's-struggles-against-transnational-

mining-companies-in-guatemala-the-sipakapa-people-vs-goldcorp-mining-company/
2011).

(last visited

Oct.

19,
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including the World Bank, private investors, the Guatemalan government, and
some citizens in the country,22 transnational mining offers opportunities for
needed economic development, including the creation of jobs, revenues that can
help alleviate poverty, and the promotion of sustainable development.23 To
others, including an overwhelming number of indigenous communities,
transnational mining has fractured communal lands, disrupted cultural identity,
destroyed the environment, and left local residents sick and even more destitute. 24
Attempts to resolve these tensions in Guatemala have embroiled local
communities in grass-roots global activism, which is concurrently bottom-up and
top-down. Local communities, for example, have seized international norms to
voice their struggles before international and domestic fora, mostly with
disappointing results.25 Simultaneously, local communities are searching for
global strategies out of poverty, fully recognizing that their local sustainability
must be global.26 In this essay, I want to share some of these dynamics with you,
partially through the lens of our students who have worked with nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") in their struggles and taught all of us a
great deal about the promise and limits of globalization for indigenous
communities in Guatemala.
By way of background, Part I provides a brief factual description of
transnational mining operations in Guatemala, with a particular focus on the
Marlin Mine in San Marcos. Part U describes the tensions and conflicts
surrounding the Marlin Mine and the various strategies adopted by the local
communities and by the Canadian company, GoldCorp, Inc., and its subsidiary
Montana Exploradora, as a response. Part III shares moments of deep learning for
some of our students who participated in our Guatemala program, to affirm that
incredible learning happens when students situate themselves in the context of
social struggles.

22. Asociaci6n de Investigaci6n y Estudios Sociales, Estudio de Opinidn Pdiblicasobre In Mineria de
Metales en Guatemala, RESUMEN EJECUTIVO 1 (2010), http://www.asies.org.gt/sites/default/files/
articulos/publicaciones/201007Opini6nMinerC3%ADaGTresumDICE_0.pdf (reporting that that fifty-seven
percent of Guatemalans are against mining while only twenty-two percent are in favor, according to a public
poll).
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part n1.
25. Grahame Russell, Goldcorp in Guatemala: Despite the Despites, the Strugglefor Human Rights and
the Environment Continues, RTS. ACTION (Sep. 22, 2010), http://www.rightsaction.org/Alerts/Goldcorp-alert
_092210.html.
26. Mercy Corps, supra note 19.
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I. CANADIAN MINING IN GUATEMALA: A STORY OF A PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE

A. Background
In Guatemala, mining operations have taken place since the beginning of the
twentieth century, but on a much smaller scale as compared to its boom in the
last two decades.27 A great part of the explanation for this recent boom is
attributable to recent transnational investment in mining, not only in Guatemala
but throughout Latin America. 2' The end of the civil war in Guatemala in 1996,
followed by the quick adoption of extremely flexible laws to promote foreign
investment in 1997, favorably changed the landscape for transnational mining
investment in the country. 29 These historical moments in Guatemala coincided
with the increased need for metals by emerging Asian markets, which increased
transnational mining operation throughout the Latin American region.3 °
By 2008, according to official government data from the Ministry of Energy
and Mines, Guatemala had granted 113 mining licenses-105 for exploration and
7 for exploitation. 3' The majority of these concessions are concentrated in the
mountainous areas of four Departments: San Marcos (17), Huehuetenango (15),
Alta Verapaz (16), and Izabal (19), where the majority of its residents are
32
Mayan.
In order to attract transnational investment, then Guatemalan President
Alvaro Arz6 (1996-1999) privatized the energy sector and procured the passage
of a new Mining Law of 1997 (Decreto 48-97). 3' Each of these measures was
adopted as part of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund's
structural adjustment policies in Guatemala, and combined were designed to
increase international investment in the country. 3 Congress approved the 1997
Mining Law quickly, under tremendous pressure from multinational corporations
and without prior popular consultation,35 as is required by the Constitution.36
27. Joris van de Sandt, Conflictos Mineros y Pueblos Indigenas en Guatemala, CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL.
L. 11 (Sept. 2009), http://www.ciel.orglLac/GuatemalalCordaid%20Guatemala%20ES%20broch-DEF.pdf.
Transnational mining in Guatemala dates back to the 1950s, with investment from U.S. and Canadian
companies that included INCO and its subsidiary Exmibal, and the U.S.-based Hanna Mining Co. The
government of Guatemala granted generous concessions to multinational mining extractions and mining
activities were controversial with indigenous communities. See also Shin Imai, et al., Breaching Indigenous
Law: Canadian Mining in Guatemala, 6 INDIGENOUS L.J. 101, 105-06 (2007); Troy S. Floyd, Bourbon
Palliativesand the CentralAmerican Mining Industry, 1765-1800, 18 THE AMERICAS 103 (1961).
28. See infra Part .B.
29. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 11.
30. Id. at5.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 5, 11.
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id.
36. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA 1985, art. 173.
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Essentially, the law reduced the percentage of royalties to be paid by mining
companies, from six to one percent of the total Gross National Product ("GNP")
produced by the state; it permitted private mining industries the right to acquire
complete property rights (100%), and created very generous corporate tax breaks,
including the use of water and importation of machinery .3 Additionally,
administrative provisions for resolving disputes under the law were extremely
vague, and there was no attempt to harmonize the 1997 Mining Law with preexisting environmental laws in the country. 8 Moreover, the law failed to consider
the rights of indigenous peoples, such as the right to prior consultation about
major development investment in their communities and to communal property
rights as codified in the International Labor Organization Convention 169 ("ILO
169").39 Finally, the Law made no provisions for closure of the mine, including
any obligations to repair the environmental impact caused by mining activities.40
B. The Marlin Gold and Silver Mine Operations
The first transnational mining operation license granted by the Government
of Guatemala after the adoption of the 1997 Mining Law was the Marlin Gold
mine in San Marcos in 1998.4' The Marlin Mine is the property of Goldcorp, Inc.
of Canada, and is operated by its subsidiary in Guatemala, Montana
Exploradora.42 Goldcorp is a large multinational corporation with assets equal to
over half of Guatemala's GNP and has become the largest taxpayer in the history
of Guatemala.43
Montana Exploradora obtained an exploration license in 1999 for the Marlin
Area in San Marcos, and immediately proceeded to acquire title to the land
through a series of individual land purchases." Then, in 2003, the Government of
Guatemala approved the company's Environmental Impact Study, which allowed
the company to begin construction of the mine in 2004 and to start exploitation
activities in 2005, with a twenty-five-year exploitation license. 4 In June 2004, the

37.

van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 11.
Id.; INSTITUTO DE AGRICULTURA, RECURSOS NATURALES Y AMBIENTE [IARNA], UNIVERSIDAD
RAFAEL LANDiVAR, MINERiA EN GUATEMALA: UN ANALISIS SOCIOCOLOGICO 197, 211-12 (2010) [hereinafter
IARNA] (detailing and critiquing the weaknesses of the environmental impact assessment process under
Guatemala's law).
39. Guatemala ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1996 as part of a commitment under the Peace
Agreements to respect the rights of indigenous communities. Victor D. Montejo, Convention 169 and the
38.

Implementation of the Peace Accords in Guatemala, J. S. & MESO AM. INDIAN RTS. CmR. (SAHC), Fall 1997,

available at http://saiic.nativeweb.orgaynguatilo.html.
40. JARNA, supra note 38, at 203.
41. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 11.
42. Id. at viii.
43. Imai et al., supra note 27, at 118.
44. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 11-12.
45. Id. at 12; see also Imai etal., supra note 27, at 109.
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International Finance Corporation ("IFC") of the World Bank approved a
$45 million (U.S.D.) loan to the project, 6 becoming the first World Bank loan in
a mining extracting project after undergoing a review process related to
Extractive Industries ("EIR") in 2003. 4
This is the only mine in Guatemala that is exploited at a grand scale.4 '8 The
Marlin Mine is also "the largest gold and silver mine in Central America., 9 The
municipalities of San Miguel Ixtahuacin and Sicacapa are largely indigenous
with their own cultural identity and language. 0 Ninety-seven percent of the
population lives in poverty and eighty percent lives in extreme poverty." The
majority (who are agricultural peasants) grow corn or beans or graze cattle, but
due to poor soil and the lack of an irrigation system, these activities are
insufficient for self-sustainability. 2 Many also perform seasonal work in sugar
cane and coffee plantations, and some are dependent on remittances sent home
from the United States.53
The Marlin Project is part of a new generation of large mines at reduced
costs.M The mine yields an estimated 250,000 ounces of gold per year and 3.6
million ounces of silver, and has a project lifeline of ten years.55 This yields about
$125 million (U.S.D.) a year.56 Total investments are calculated at $254 million
(U.S.D.), and it is estimated the mine will yield $893 million (U.S.D.) in ten
57
years.

46. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF GOLDCORP'S MARLIN
MINE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (Nadene Rehnby, Hands on Publication ed., 2010).
47. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 13.
48. DIRECCION GENERAL DE MINERIA, GOBIERNO DE GUATEMALA, ANUARIO ESTADiSTICO MINERO,
682
/
2008, at 5 (2008), available at http://www.mem.gob.gtlPortallDocumentslMagazines/2010-05/
to
the
Guatemala
mining
in
in
ANUARIOESTADISTICO_2008.pdf (attributing the largest growth
exploitation of silver and gold by the Marlin Mine).
49. Niladri Basu et al., A Combined Ecological and Epidemiologic Investigation of Metal Exposures
Amongst Indigenous Peoples Near the Marlin Mine in Western Guatemala, 409 Sci. TOTAL ENV'T 70 (2010).
The Marlin Project covers twenty square km, 85% of which is found in San Miguel IxtahuacAn and 15% of
which is in Sipacapa. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 19.
50. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 21. Approximately 95% of the 29,650 residents of San Miguel
Ixtahuacin are dispersed in twenty villages and identify as Mayas Main, the fourth largest linguistic group of
Guatemala. The vast majority of the 14,050 inhabitants of the thirteen villages that comprise Sipacapa are,
according to the last census, 70% indigenous (although municipal statistics put the number more at 88%) and
belong to the linguistic group Mayas Sipakapenses. Id.; see also Imai et al., supra note 27, at 110.
51. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 22.
52. Id. at 21, 24.
53. Id. at 21.
54. VINCENT CASTAGNINO, METAL MINING AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA: THE MARLIN MINE
IN SAN MARCOS 10 (Peace Brigades Int'l ed., 2006), available at http://goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.
wordpress.comI2010/07/pbi-minenmarlin-en.pdf.
55. Basu et al., supra note 49, at 70.
56. See id.
57. Just in 2006-2007 alone, the mine yielded Goldcorp $312 million, in light of price increases for gold
and silver, van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 20.
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II. THE CONFLICT

A. Indigenous Communities
According to many members of the affected indigenous communities and
groups who represent them, the Marlin Mine, from its inception, has operated
overwhelmingly to their detriment and in direct violation of the sovereignty of
indigenous communities in the region.58
One significant issue of contention is that the government of Guatemala
never undertook prior consultations with the communities before deciding to
grant the mining license concession to Montana Exploradora,59 as required by
ILO 169.'o In 2003, Montana Exploradora held a series of informational meetings
and kept a log of names for each of the attendees, seemingly to comply with the
community consultation requirement in order to receive loan approval from the
World Bank.6' Most of the attendees, however, saw these meetings as principally
promotional, with no opportunity for meaningful participation; in fact, as the
meetings were held in Spanish, few actually understood what was happening.62
Another major concern pertained to Montana Exploradora's practices of land
acquisition to construct the mine, which not only ignored communal property
rights but are alleged to have employed coercion, intimidation and lies to get
individual land owners to agree to part with their land.63 Montana Exploradora's
land acquisition began as early as 1999, even before it owned the mining
concession. 4 Montana Exploradora contracted a third-party company called
Peridot, S.A., which, according to community leaders, paid repeated and
persistent visits to individual families with offers of free food and misleading
assurances of future jobs, or false promises of remuneration if minerals were
found, in order to induce them to sell their land. 65 Further, in its Report on Land
Acquisition ("LAP"), offered in 2004 to justify its loan request to the World
Bank, Montana Exploradora downplayed the cultural significance of land
ownership to the region, 6 although a more recent company-commissioned human
rights assessment acknowledged that land acquisition procedures failed to respect

58.

James Rodriguez, Photo Essay: Gold Mine Worsens Social Tensions in Guatemala, UPSIDE DOWN

WORLD (July 31, 2007), http:/fupsidedownworld.orglmaincontent/view/836/33/.

59. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 13.
60. Article 6 of ILO 169 provides in part that governments shall "consult the [indigenous] peoples
concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly."
61. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 41.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 28.
64. Id. at 27.
65. Id. at 27-28.
66. Id. at 26.
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indigenous peoples' land rights. 67 The lands of San Miguel Ixtahuacan and
Sipacapa form part of an integral collective land title with property rightsknown as "ejidos" or "tierras comunales"-dating back to the beginning of the
twentieth century. 6' These communal properties are legally recognized in
Guatemala and are formally administered by local governments in the name of
indigenous communities.6 9 Under this regime, individual families have the right
to use, inherit, register, and even transfer land.70 However, people are not 100%
owners of the land.' Rather, the land is owned collectively by the community,
such that any sale of property must be formally recognized under domestic law
by the municipal mayor and community leaders.72
"Montana has purchased over 600 parcels of land from hundreds of Main and
Sipakapense land-holders within the 20 square kilometers of its mining license
and continues to acquire land around the Marlin Mine. 73 Ultimately, these
purchases restricted access to land to families and communities adjacent to the
mine.74 Montana Exploradora excavates 5,000 tons of rock daily, and, as a result,
the hills surrounding the towns have been transformed into huge craters and
mounds of rock waste.75 Residents must now live in severely reduced lots of land,
forced to witness destroyed landscapes or risk losing their ties to community by
moving.76 As a result of dynamite explosions, residents must also endure the
nearby dusty and noisy roads, as well as the large cracks that frequently occur
along the walls and floors of their tiny adobe houses.71
A third significant concern for indigenous communities has been the
environmental harm caused to their communities as a direct result of mining
activities. 7' To understand the nature and scope of this harm, it is necessary to
explain the mining process used in the Marlin Mine. Mining is a mixture of two
open pits and one underground facility whereby silver and gold is extracted
through a cyanide leaching process. 9 The project extracts rock either from the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

ON COMMON GROUNDS CONSULTANTS
van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 25.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.

INC.,

supra note 46, at 21.

ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supranote 46, at 20.

van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 25.
ld.
ld. at 29.
Id.; see also COMISION PASTORAL PAZ Y EcOLOGIA (COPAE) & UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST SERV.
COMM. (UUSC), DAMAGED BUILDINGS NEAR THE MARLN MINE: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND
ANALYSIS OF BUILDING DAMAGE IN THE VILLAGES OF AGEL, EL SALITRE, SAN JoSt IXCANICHE, AND SAN JOSt
NUEVA ESPERANZA, SAN MIGUEL IXTAHUACAN AND SIPACAPA MUNICIPALITIES, SAN MARCOS DEPARTMENT,
GUATEMALA (2009) [hereinafter COPAE & UUSC], available at http://resistance-mining.org/english/

?q=node/147.
78. IARNA, supra note 38, at 201.
79. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 20.
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open pit or from a subterranean tunnel.8" Minerals are then separated from the
rock waste and sent to tanks for chemical processing, which separates the gold
from other chemicals using a very toxic solution of cyanide."' The sediment that
remains is called "colas" and is transported to a lake; these sediments, which are
highly toxic, end up at the bottom of the lake. 2 The company estimates that
during its lifetime, the mine will produce 44 million tons of rock and 14 million
tons of colas. 83
The mining process also uses large quantities of water, close to 250,000 liters
of water per hour-the equivalent of what a typical family in the area might use
in twenty-two years.M4 Combined, these environmental impacts create water
shortages and health risks for the community.85 Since 2006, communities living
below the river have complained of cattle and sheep dying, and since 2007,
people have complained of skin rashes, hair loss, respiratory difficulties and
other disorders due to the mine's pollution.86 Residents have also reported the
drying up of wells and fruit trees in the area."
Finally, indigenous communities report that Montana Exploradora's presence
created community tensions and divisions that did not exist before-between
those who oppose the mine and those who support it because of job creationleading to serious governability problems, particularly in San Marcos.88 Mining
activities did create some jobs, which changed the way of life for the few
families employed in the mine who earn about $300 (U.S.D.) monthly, as well as
families who came from outside the community. 9 In Sipacapa, a strong antimining resistance has existed from the beginning; but here too, there have been
significant divisions.'
B. Montana Exploradoraand the State
From the beginning, the government of Guatemala has supported the Marlin
Mine, who viewed it as a source of job creation and an opportunity for

80. Id. at 30.
81. Id.
82. Id. A human rights assessment report commissioned on behalf of Goldcorp states that mine wastes
(tailings and rocks) are stored behind a cross-valley dam consisting of a rockfill shell with a low permeability
core. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 46, at 9.

83. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 30.
84. Id. at 34.
85. Id. at 33-34.
86. Id. at 33; see Basu et al., supra note 49, at 71; see also Canadian Mine Accused of Causing Skin
Infections, BBC (Mar. 11, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas7934513.stm.
87. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 35.
88. Id. at 37.
89. Id. at 38.
90. Id. at 39-40.
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sustainable economic development in the country. 9' As a result, Guatemala has
sided with Montana Exploradora in its denial of the claims for violations and
harms advanced by local indigenous communities, as well as the company's
dismissal of findings of environmental impact studies conducted in the region."'
Furthermore, the Guatemalan government has failed to conduct its own
independent environmental impact studies, 93 as the mining law simply requires
review of environmental impact studies submitted by the company.94
For its part, Montana Exploradora stressed only the positive effects of the
Marlin project (in annual periodic reports and its promotional material). 95 In
terms of job creation, for example, Montana Exploradora's data shows that from
2005 to 2008, local employment ranged from 900 to 1300 local employees,
generating an average payroll cost of approximately $4.8 million (U.S.D.)
annually.9 6 A report commissioned by the University of Amsterdam, School of
Law reports even fewer numbers. 97 According to those numbers, during the
mine's construction, Montana Exploradora employed 870 workers from local
communities, but only 160 of these were permanent jobs. 9 After the mine was
constructed, very few families were actually employed. 99
Company data also reported important economic contributions to the
Guatemalan government and the local communities, in terms of tax and royalty
revenues.'" In fact, in 2006, Montana Exploradora voluntarily relinquished the
tax exemption, which immediately increased the revenue flows to the national
government.'' Thus, from 2005 to 2008, the company reported to have paid an
average of $6.4 million (U.S.D.) in taxes per year, and about $1.5 million
(U.S.D.) in royalties to the Guatemalan government.'0 2 Goldcorp claimed that by
the completion of the mine, it will have paid Guatemala in taxes and royalties a
total of $69.9 million (U.S.D.) over a period of eleven years.'03
However, the Guatemalan government invested an incredibly low proportion
of its national revenue into social programs, which, as acknowledged by a recent
company-commissioned human rights impact report, makes it too difficult to
91. Id. at 11.
92. See infra Part I.D.
93. See van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 11.
94. Guatemalan Mining Law, 48-97, ch. I1, art. 7-8 (Guat.), available at http://www.mem.gob.gt/
Portal/MEMDocuments/DGM/Ley/mining%201aw%20and%20its%20regulation.pdf.
95. A recent example includes ON COMMON GROUNDS CONSULTANTS INC., supranote 46, at 21.
96. id. at 9.
97. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 20.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 29. In a study conducted by the Ministry of Labor in Guatemala, at least in 2007, extractive
mining represented only 0.27% of the labor force nationally. IARNA, supra note 38, at 207.
100. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 46, at 9.
101. Id. at 24.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Imai etal., supra note 27, at 118.
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track actual positive social impacts to the country.' 4 As much as half of the
royalties, however, are shared with local communities. 05 Some figures published
in a report by the University of Landfvar show Sipacapa received an average of
$920,000 (U.S.D.) between 2006 and 2008.' o This same report highlighted that
this has led Sipacapa to develop a robust program of economic development that
included ecological and environmental preservation and sustainable agricultural
production.' 7
In terms of land acquisition, Montana Exploradora's position is that the sales
of land were entirely voluntary, and that a price higher than market value was
paid to each land owner.' 8 On the issue of consultations, Montana Exploradora
maintained having complied with the prerequisites as part of the approval of
mining licenses and World Bank requirements. '9 In regard to the consultative
process, the sole concessions that Goldcorp has made is the need to interact more
with the Guatemalan government, encourage implementation of an appropriate
framework for consultations with indigenous peoples, and to provide training to
its staff on ILO 169."0 Heeding this call, the government of Guatemala, adopted
an administrative code to implement ILO 169's consultative process in May
2011, but it did so in secret and without consulting any of the indigenous
communities."' The code was rejected by indigenous and labor groups for
disrespecting the very nature of the ILO 169 by adopting standardized procedures
that did not respect the sovereignty of each Indigenous nation; indeed, the code
was labeled an attempt to circumvent ILO 169 entirely."' The Constitutional
Court of Guatemala appeared to share some of the same concerns and in May
2011, granted a provisional measure enjoining the code's implementation." 3
In terms of environmental and health harms, Montana Exploradora has, as a
general matter, denied environmental risks through a series of environmental
impact assessments and reports that have minimized the environmental harms of
the project."' As to water, for example, Montana Exploradora claims that the
104. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 24.
105. See IARNA, supra note 38, at 215.
106. Id. The calculation takes the average of revenues received between 2006 and 2008 (7.3 million
quetzales) and multiplies it by .216, the Quetzal rate conversion for U.S. dollars.
107. Id.
108. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 28. Montana Exploradora reports to have paid the $4,567 (U.S.D.)
per acre to landowners for land that usually sells for less than a third of that price. See also Imai et al., supra
note 27, at 109.
109. But see ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 46, at 12.
110. Id. at4-5.
111. Julio F. Lara, Amparo Provisional Favorece a Comunidades Ind(genas, PRENSA LIBRE (May 26,
2011), http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Amparo-provisional-favorece-indigenas-0-487751246.html.
112. Por Agencia EFE, Confederacirn Denuncia Intento Reglamentar Consultas a Indigenas, PRENSA
LIBRE (June 6, 2011), http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/Confederacion-reglamentar-consultasindigenas-Guatemala_0_494350718.html.
113. Lara, supra note 111.
114. van de Sandt, supranote 27, at 30.
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company does not impact local water use.'1 5 Rather, Montana Exploradora claims
to have recycled eighty-five percent of the water used and that the rest is taken
from a well that is 300 meters deep. This finding, however, has been disputed
by other studies."7 Also, more recent company studies continue to diverge in
results from those commissioned by local human rights groups or conducted by
independent experts, as discussed in Part D infra."' In fact, Montana Exploradora
has made few concessions with regard to the need to change any of its
environmental practices. " 9
Montana Exploradora worked hard to improve its image as a socially
responsible corporate entity in Guatemala and abroad, by investing in local social
programs through a foundation called Sierra Madre, which is partially funded by
World Bank loans.' 2° The Sierra Madre foundation has invested in community
projects and social investment initiatives that included "funding of additional
teachers, some training of teaching staff, improvement of school facilities," and
the provision of scholarships. 12 Sierra Madre has also contributed to health
programs, including building a health center, and projects that improved access
to potable water systems.1 2 Even company commission reports have found,
however, that there is a lack of clarity about the foundation's actual and yearly
contributions.12 The lack of clear objectives, social indicators, and monitoring
and evaluation standards has made it difficult to assess the effectiveness of

115.

DENNIS KEMP, KP CONSULTING, ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT

2 (2010), available at http://www.hria-guatemala.com/en/docs/
Human%20Rights/HRAAppendix HExternalEnvironmentalReviewKPConsulting.pdf.
116. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 34; KEMP, supra note 115.
117. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 34; see also infra Part II.D.
118. See infra Part l.D.
119. The few concessions the company has made, based on its most recent environmental assessment
report, is the need to study the causes of damage to houses; to improve community participation in the
company's water contamination studies; to initiate a health monitoring system with the government's Ministry
of Health; to support municipal government efforts to protect and improve watersheds; and to agree to pay the
"costs of closing the Marlin Mine," stating that said amount will be reached in consultation with the government
of Guatemala and in accordance with corporate accounting standards. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS
INC., supra note 46, at 6-7. Those standards are the Canadian and U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP") relating to Asset Retirement Obligations ("ARO"). Id. at 6.
120. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 13. On its website, Goldcorp includes a link to Corporate
Responsibility, which has the company's voluntary code of conduct, and states that "Goldcorp is
committed to conducting our business responsibly at all times, which means respecting the safety and
health of our employees, protecting the environment, respecting the human rights of our employees
and the residents of the communities in which we operate, and contributing to the sustainable development
those communities." This page also details the various community based projects associated with its mining
activities. Goldcorp's Social Responsibility Policy, GOLDCORP, http://www.goldcorp.com/Theme/Gold
Corp/files/CSR%2OPolicy%2OStatement.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
121. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 46, at 24.
122. Id.; see also Imai et al., supra note 27, at 119.
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123.

ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 46, at 24.
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Montana Exploradora's social investment.' 24 To those who critique these efforts,
they point to the persistent extreme poverty in the region and the harm to
communities caused by the mine, which is much greater than the company's
social investment.'2
C. Push Back and Resistance
Since 2003, local community actors comprised of the local Catholic Church,
traditional indigenous and community leaders, and Guatemalan and international
environmental justice groups, have organized to carry out several local and
global strategies to stop the Marlin project. 2 6 In turn, Montana Exploradora and
Goldcorp have aggressively defended their corporate interests by intervening in
domestic or international legal strategies that sought to curtail mining activities,
and commissioned their own environmental impact studies that denied or
undermined any environmental or health harms to the communities.2 For its
part, with few exceptions,' the Ministry of Mining has been an outspoken
supporter of Montana Exploradora, resorting to2 9 policing and prosecutorial
intervention to stop local protests against the mine.'
National dialogue around the issue of mining in Guatemala has been
fractured and divisive from the beginning, particularly along ethnic lines.'3°
Indigenous communities, along with various national organizations, organized in
late 2004 to
spark a dialogue of resistance against mining activities in their
•
31
communities. As a response, the Guatemalan government organized its own
National Mining Conference in December 2004 in order to turn the tide in favor
of mining in the country. 3 2 The government-sponsored mining Conference was
124.
125.

Id.
See, e.g., ASOCIACI6N DE INVESTIGACI6N Y ESTUDIOS SOCIALES, ESTUDIO COSTO BENEFICIO DE
LA MINA MARLIN EN SAN MARCOS, GUATEMALA, (2010), available at http://es.oxfamamerica.org.s3.
amazonaws.com/publications/Estudio-costo._beneficiomina_marlin-guatemala.pdf.
126. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 14-16, 23, 47-54.
127. See, e.g., KEMP, supra note 115.
128. One such exception has been the Human Rights Ombudsman Office of Guatemala, which has been
critical of mining activities in the country. In fact, in 2005, Montana Exploradora filed a writ against the Human
Rights Ombudsman, claiming the company's rights were violated when the Ombudsman issued a resolution
citing the company's human rights violations. The Constitutional Court of Guatemala denied the writ in 2006
because the Ombudsman's findings were mere recommendations and, thus, did not represent a real harm to the
company. Appendix F: Overview of Legal Cases Involving The Marlin Mine, HRIA GUAT., http://hriaguatemala. com/en/docs/Human%20Rights/HRAAppendixFLegal-Cases.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
Another exception included when the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources administratively faulted
the company for environmental non-compliance. Montana Exploradora has appealed the Ministry's findings,
which await resolution. Id.
129. See, e.g., Bernadette Maheandiran et al., Goldcorp and HudBay Minerals in Guatemala, 6
OSGOODE HALL COMP. RES. IN L. & POL. ECON. 3, 5 (2010).
130. van de Sandt, supranote 27, at 14.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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supported by the Canadian Embassy and was attended by representatives from
the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, Montana
Exploradora, and the Catholic Church, but excluded very important sectors of
civil society.' No dialogue between the indigenous community and government
has taken place, even as similar topics discussing the need for reform were
addressed at each conference. "4
The divisiveness of the issue between indigenous communities on the one
hand, and the government and mining companies on the other, came to a head in
popular demonstrations of physical resistance. '35In 2005 in Sololi and again in
2007 in San Miguel Ixtahuacin, residents joined forces to block the road to
prevent the entrance of Montana Exploradora equipment and personnel to the
mine. 3 6 At each of these protests, Guatemalan police forcibly removed the
participants, which produced some casualties, and subsequently filed criminal
charges against some of the organizers. "'
One of the most significant achievements by indigenous communities has
been the organization of a resistance movement through the implementation of
popular consultations among indigenous communities, all of which have voted a
resounding "NO" to mega-mining project activities."' The first communityorganized referendum was held in Sicapaca in 2005 against the Marlin Mine. 9
Montana Exploradora not only tried to publically discredit the referendum
process, calling it "patently corrupt,"'40 but also filed an action with the Ministry
of Mining of Guatemala alleging unconstitutionality and seeking an injunction
against the referendum, maintaining that the very act of voting was
unconstitutional. 14' Initially, the Court of Constitutionality granted the injunction,
but lifted it the day before the referendum was to take place, allowing it to4
1
proceed on June 18, 2005.142 The mine was rejected by an absolute majority.
The victory of the Sipacapa vote, however, was short-lived, at least in terms of its
legal power. In 2007, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala declared that the
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Sololi residents blocked, for forty days, the Panamerican road to keep mining machinery from
reaching its destination, with the support of the local Mayan mayor, demanding revocation of the mining
license. Then, in 2007, a group of citizens in San Miguel Ixtahuacan blocked the road to the entrance of the
Marlin mine. Id. at 14, 54. See also Amanda M. Fulmer et al., Indigenous Rights, Resistance, and the Law:
Lessons from a Guatemalan Mine, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & SoC'Y 4, 91 (2008); see also Imai et al., supra note
27, at 110.
137. van de Sandt, supranote 27, at 54; see also Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 3, 5.
138. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 16.
139. Id.; see also Imai et al., supra note 27, at 111.
140. Imai et al., supra note 27, at 112.
141. Id. at 125; see also Maheandiran, et. al., supra note 129, at 6.
142. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 44.
143. Of the total number of registered voters (2,564), 2,448 voted against (98%), thirty-five voted in
favor, and thirty-five did not vote. Id. at 16.
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popular referendum, while permissible, had no binding legal effect.'" The
Court's conclusions were based on the fact that under Article 121 of the
Guatemalan Constitution, the Government retained the property rights to the
subsoil of any land containing mineral deposits.145 Thus, the municipality lacked
legal standing to decide the fate of these mineral resources, to which the
government may grant licenses to exploit based on public necessity.' 46 Montana
Exploradora claimed that the Court's decision vindicated the Marlin Mine's
operations; in truth, the Constitutional Court's position was more nuanced since
it was sharply critical of the state for its failure to adequately consult the
community prior to the mining concession, and for curtailing community efforts
for a referendum. "47 Despite the ruling of the Constitutional Court, the popular
referendum process continued with tremendous momentum. The same
referendum was adopted in fifty-seven municipalities in the Western highlands
(the majority in San Marcos and Huehuetenango),' s and each declared its
1
opposition to the mines in overwhelming numbers.
Indigenous communities and environmental justice groups have also
employed legal strategies locally, internationally, and transnationally to try to
stop or reform the Marlin mining operation. Domestically, in November 2003,
community leaders from San Marcos and Sipacapa solicited the revocation of the
mining license concession from the Mining Ministry in November 2003.150 Then,
in 2006, a Guatemalan environmental NGO, Colectivo Madre Selva, filed
criminal complaints against Montana Exploradora for contaminating the Tzald
River. "' The suit was dismissed when the Ministry of Energy concluded that2
water samples collected by the prosecutor's office did not show contamination.1
Beginning in 2007, several administrative complaints were filed with the
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, but none have been served to
the company."' In 2007, the Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores and the
Comisi6n Latinoamericana por los Derechos Humanos y las Libertades de los
Trabajadores y Pueblos alleged that residual waters from the mine were being
49

144.

HRIA GUAT., supra note 128.

REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA 1985 CONSTITUTION WITH 1993 REFORMS Nov. 17, 1993, art. 121
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Guate/guate93.htnl.
146. See van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 53-54; Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 45.
147. Meheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 6; see also Imai et al., supra note 27, at 126.
148. Civic Opposition Throughout Guatemala Through Community Consultations,COMISI6N PASTORAL
PAZ YECOLOGIA [COPAEI (Sept. 13, 2006, 3:12 PM), http://www.resistance-mining.org/english/?q=node/9.
149. According to the website of the Pastoral Commission of Peace and Ecology (COPAE), to date,
717,968 persons have voted "NO" in fifty-seven different consultative processes. 717,968 Personas han Dicho
145.

NO a los Megaproyectos en 57 Consultas, COMISON PASTORAL PAZ Y ECOLOGiA [COPAE] (Dec. 1, 2010,

4:03 PM), http://www.resistencia-mineria.org/espanol/?q=node/334.
150. See van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 14.
151. ON COMMON GROUND INC., supranote 46, at 1.
152. Id.
153. See id.
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dumped into rivers close to the Marlin Mine.74Madre Selva complained again in
2008 of contamination of the Tzald River by Montana Exploradora, although it
appeared the Ministry has not found evidence of mercury in the river.' The
of wells in the
Municipality of Sipacapa also complained of the drying 5 up
6
activities.
Mine's
Marlin
from
resulted
have
community that
Guatemalan domestic efforts have also sought broader reforms to
Guatemala's mining laws. In 2008, another Guatemalan NGO, the Center for
Environmental Legal and Social Action ("CALAS"), filed a petition with the
Constitutional Court of Guatemala to declare sections of the Mining Act
unconstitutional as a breach of environmental standards.' 57 The Constitutional
Court granted the petition in 2009 and found in favor of CALAS. 5 8 In addition,
several mining law reform initiatives have been introduced in Congress.'59 Some
of the initiatives sought, for example, to increase the royalties that must be paid
from mining extraction from one to ten percent;' 60 other laws sought to suspend
all metal mining indefinitely.'16 Unfortunately, none of these various law reform
proposals have been successful, in part due to the inability of the proponents of
the reforms to
reach a consensus about the types of reforms that are necessary for
62
Guatemala.
Internationally, the first complaint was filed in 2005 by the World Bank and
local communities (represented by Madre Selva), and principally alleged water
misuse contamination. 63 That same year, the World Bank issued a report
admitting that the government had not established a clear standard for monitoring
water regulation compliance and water contamination, and acknowledged that the64
environmental impact from wasted rock was greater than initially estimated.'
However, the report minimized the environmental impact with regard to
contamination. 65 Since 2006, the Central Union of Guatemalan Workers and the
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2.
158. The decision (in Spanish) can be found at Corte De Constitucionalidad, Republica de
Guatemala, C.A. (2009) Case File 1491-2007, available at http://blog.reportero.org/wp-content/leyminera-inconstitutionalidad.pdf.
159. See IARNA, supra note 38, at 216.
160. Mike McDonald, Retired General PromisesSecurity in Guatemala Vote, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2011,
1:40 AM), http://www.reuters.coml article/201 1/09/09/us-guatemala-election-idUSTRE788 1BE20110909.
161. Id.
162. Interview with Dr. Yuri Melini, Dir., CALAS (Jan. 2011).
163. See Eric Holt-Gimdnez & Lyra Spang, Glamis in Guatemala:A Project Alert on the Marlin Mine,
BANK INFO. CTR. USA (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.2019.aspx.
164. See OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISORIOMBUDSMAN, ASSESSMENT OF A COMPLAINT
SUBMITrED TO CAO IN RELATION TO THE MARLIN MINING PROJECT IN GUATEMALA (2005), available at

http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/documents/CAO-Marlin-assessment-English7Sep05.pdf.
165. Id.; see also Imai et al., supra note 27, at 120.
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Union of Guatemalan Workers initiated a series of communications with the
International Labour Organization's Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations ("CEACR") about the need for Guatemala to
establish mechanisms for implementing ILO 169.166 The CEACR continues to
monitor the situation pending Guatemala's adoption of legislation to implement
ILO 169.167
In 2007, eighteen Maya-Main communities filed a complaint in the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights against the Guatemalan government for
its failure to heed the will of indigenous communities against the Marlin Mine
operations (as evidenced by the popular referendums) and for its failure to protect
indigenous communities against serious environmental and health harms
resulting from the mine's operation. 68 The Inter-American Commission granted
the petitioner's request for precautionary measures in May 2010, asking the
Guatemalan government to suspend the Marlin mining operations on the basis
that they were causing irreparable harm to the petitioning indigenous
communities. 69 In June 2010, however, Guatemalan President klvaro Col6m
publically stated that he would not seek the mine's suspension, calling the
Commission's findings of irreparable harm baseless.170 Ten months after the
Inter-American Commission issued its precautionary measures, Oxfam
International initiated a campaign in March 2011 to urge the U.S. Congress to
send a letter to President Col6m, requesting the suspension of the Marlin Mine
operation. 7' Fifteen U.S. Congress members sent a letter dated March 30, 2011 to
President Col6m, urging him to comply with the Inter-American Commission
ruling. However, the Guatemalan government formally resolved not to suspend
mining operations in June 2011.173 To date, mining operations continue.
The Latin American Water Tribunal, a non-governmental international
body,' issued a moral condemnation against the Guatemalan government during
166. ON COMMON GROUND, INC., supra note 46.
167. Id.
168. CIDH Pide que se Suspensa la Mina Marlin, COMISION PASTORAL PAZ Y ECOLOGA [COPAE]
(June 14, 2010, 10:58 AM), http://www.resistencia-mineria.org/espanolU?q=node/285.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Suspend the Marlin Mine Campaign, OXFAM INT'L, http://actfast.oxfamamerica.org/index.phpl
issues/business (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
172. Letter from Jan Schakowsky, James P. Moran, Sam Farr, Lynn Woolsey, James P. McGovern, Pete
Stark, Donald Payne, Jesse L. Jackson, Jr., Barney Frank, John W. Olver, Hank Johnson, Michael Michaud,
Grace F. Napolitano, Maurice Hinchey, & David Wu, Reps., H.R., to Alvaro Colom Caballeros, President of
Guatemala (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://www.rightsaction.org/articles/Congressionalletter_
onMarlinmine_04071 .html (last visited Nov. 1,2011).
173. Guatemala DescartaCierre de Minera Canadiense Pese a Fallo de CJDH, PRENSA LIBRE (June 12,
2011, 11:11 AM), http://prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/Guatemala-desarta-minera-canadiense-CIDH
0_497950301.html.
174. For more information about the Latin American Water Tribunal, visit IRC INT'L WATER AND
SANITATION CTR., http://www.irc.nYpagel708l (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
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public hearings held in Antigua in 2008, for not adequately regulating the Marlin
Mine and for disregarding indigenous sovereignty and rights in its mining
concession. The Tribunal also condemned Montana Exploradora for the damage
caused to the environment and indigenous populations of San Miguel Ixtahuacan
and Sipacapa."'
In Canada, efforts have more directly targeted Goldcorp's corporate
responsibility and have involved litigation, shareholder accountability initiatives,
and legislative reforms. Accountability efforts in Canada have become difficult,
however, because the Canadian government, or at least its embassy in
Guatemala, has been very active in promoting and praising Canadian mining in
Guatemala.' 6 In 2006, the Canadian government held a series of roundtables on
corporate responsibility in response to a Parliamentary report which called for the
strengthening of programs and policies with regard to mining practices by
Canadian companies in developing countries. 7 7 The result was the release of an
Advisory Group Report which recommended, inter alia, the development of a
Canadian corporate social responsibility framework, including the creation of an
ombudsman to investigate complaints against Canadian extractive companies in
developing nations.' 8 However, the Canadian government only adopted a policy
known as "Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR Strategy for the
International Extractive Sector," which fell short of the recommendations in the
Advisory Report. 179 In response, Bill C-300 was introduced, which would require,
inter alia, the Minister to establish corporate accountability standards for
Canadian extractive companies and create a mechanism for complaints with the
Minister which would result in divestment from the corporation by the Canada
Pension Plan.8 ° C-300 was largely supported by many NGOs and equally
despised by the mining industry," ' which said it could affect the competitiveness
of the Canadian resource companies.'82 Ultimately, Canada rejected the
legislation in a close vote of 140 to 134 in the Canadian House of Commons in
November 2010.183
In 2009, a coalition of indigenous communities and others filed a complaint
with the Canadian government against the Marlin Mine operation under the
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the Organization of Economic CoThird Latin American Regional Public Hearing, Guatemala City, 2008, LATIN AM. WATER
http://www.tragua.com/english/hearing/2008/guatemala_2008.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
176. Imai et al., supra note 27, at 131-32.
177. Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 13.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see also Imai et al., supra note 27, at 133-35.
180. Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 13-14.
181. Id. at 14; Bill C-300 Defeated in CanadianParliament,MINING, PEOPLE AND THE ENV'T (Nov. 15,
2010, 5:09 PM) [hereinafter Bill C-300], available at http://www.mpe-magazine.conenviromine/bill-c-300defeated-in-canadian-parliament.
182. Bill C-300, supra note 181.
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operation and Development ("OECD"),'4 of which Canada is a member.' The
complaint
asked the National Contact Points ("NCPs"), the OECD complaining
186
b
body, to investigate Goldcorp's activities at the Marlin Mine and make
recommendations to ensure the company's compliance with the OECD
guidelines. 8 7 The complaint is still pending.' Canada's National Contact Point,
the office designated to receive OECD complaints,' publically acknowledged
receiving seven submissions from interested stakeholders, regarding corporate
conduct and the OECD Guidelines.' 9° Only four of the complaints, not including
Guatemala's complaint, have been considered by the NCP as specific instances.' 9'
Canada's NCP website provides no additional information about the status of the
Marlin Mine complaint.' 92
Also in 2009, Goldcorp's shareholder pressure forced the company to
undertake a Human Rights Impact Assessment.'93 Under Canadian law, the
directors of a corporation typically set the agenda for discussion at shareholder
meetings, but shareholders may request to add an item, subject to meeting several
procedural and substantive requirements.'94 In Canada, environmental activists
95
have used the shareholder proposal to influence corporate social responsibility.
In 2008, Goldcorp refused to circulate the proposal relating to the Marlin Mine;
however, a consortium of investors circulated a second proposal, which was
withdrawn only after Goldcorp agreed to conduct a Human Rights Impact
Assessment.'96 The Assessment, however, was controversial from the very

184. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: About, ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION AND DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en _2649_34889_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
185. Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 9.
186. In 2000, the OECD Council created a system of NCPs with representatives from each of the
member states with some capacity to investigate complaints and seek resolution from the parties. The
resolutions of the NPC are only recommendations and are not binding. Id. at 9.
187. Id. at 10; see also Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprises, supra note 184 (explaining the OECD
Guidelines).
188. Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 10.
189. Id. at 9.
190. See Canada's National Contact Point (NCP), FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE CAN.,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ncp-pcn/specific-specifique.aspx?lang=
eng&menu-id=7&menu=R (last modified Feb. 24, 2009) (listing the Specific Instances considered by Canada's
NCP).
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 3.
194. Id. at 10-11 (explaining shareholder procedures and substantive requirements for influencing a
shareholder meeting agenda under the Canadian Business Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44).
195. Id. at ll.
196. Id. at 11. A group of socially responsible investors that own shares in Goldcorp, including the
Public Service Alliance of Canada ("PSAC") Staff Pension Fund, the Ethical Funds Company, the First
Swedish National Pension Fund and the Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund proposed the Assessment. ON
COMMON GROUNDS CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 46.
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beginning. 97 As explained below, the Marlin Mine has been the subject of study
after study with regard to environmental and other types of harms; and yet, the
results have varied vastly depending on who is sponsoring the report, having the
effect of polarizing the issue further. Goldcorp has simply refused to accept the
validity of any study that has linked environmental and other types of harms to
the Marlin Mine operations.'95 Moreover, the company's previous environmental
impact studies of the mine have invariably concluded that mining operations will
produce few environmental and other human rights harms to the communities. 99
It is not a surprise, then, that there has also been a great deal of skepticism around
this new effort. 200 Furthermore, the Assessment assumed that the Goldcorp would
remain in the area, and hence its focus would be on damage mitigation rather
than a decision to stop mining activities. 20 ' Ultimately, the Assessment was
awarded to a Canadian consulting company, Common Ground Consultants,
Inc. 2° During its implementation, organizations complained that the Assessment
provoked further tensions between the corporation and local residents, while
several civil society organizations simply refused to participate. 23 Despite this,
the HRIA was completed in May 2010, after an eighteen month period of data
collection and investigations; some of the findings and Goldcorp's responses are
taken up in the next section.2 4 Apparently, at least a few of the shareholders
remain quite unsatisfied with the results to date.2' On March 24, 2011, the
Guatemalan press reported that two shareholders have now called for the
suspension of the Marlin Mine based on the Inter-American Commission's
precautionary order.2 6
Another type of community resistance to mining activities has come in the
form of efforts to create alternative means of economic sustainability. Since
197. Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 11.
198. See infra Part II.D.
199. Id.
200. "Professor Douglas Cassel of the University of Notre Dame's Centre for Civil and Human Rights
turned down Goldcorp's offer to tender a bid for the Assessment stating that he was not confident that the terms
set by Goldcorp would yield a full and independent analysis." Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 11.
201. Id. at 12.
202. Id. at 11.
203. Id. The Assessment's validity came under serious question when the Public Service Alliance of
Canada, one of the shareholder proponents of the Assessment, withdrew from the process, citing increasing
concerns over the impartiality of the HRIA, as well as the coercive nature of its implementation with local
communities. Bill Law, Canada Goldmine Worries Grow, BBC (Mar. 30, 2009, 2:20 PM), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi7968888.stm (citing a PSAC statement as follows: "PSAC has become increasingly concerned
with the HRIA process and its relationship with the local communities. We have been especially concerned
about the lack of free and informed prior consent of the communities in regards to the HRIA, and that the
interest of Goldcorp are being put before the interests of the local people.").
204. See infra Part ILD.
205. See Alberto Ramfrez, Accionistas de Goldcorp Inc. Exigen el Cierre de Mina Marlin, PRENSA
LIBRE (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.prensalibre.comnoticias/Accionistas-exigen-cierre-mina-Marlin 0_449
955024.html.
206. Id.

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 24
2007, the association Rex Ulew, in cooperation with the Comisi6n Pastoral Paz y
Ecologfa [The Pastoral Commission on Peace and Ecology] ("COPAE"),
organized several participatory forums to develop alternative sustainability
projects, such as organic coffee, and international funding for the project
emerged. 0 7 There is also a plan to grow fruits and vegetables with the aim to
promote the cooperative model and rid the market of the middle-man between
exporters and local growers, so that profits can be kept local)0 8
D. EnvironmentalImpact Assessments of the Marlin Mine
Advocacy for and against the mine has called for the production of several,
often contradictory, environmental impact studies of the mine's activities. One
study conducted in 2005 was commissioned by Madre Selva and completed by
Robert Moran, who also reviewed the company's environmental impact
statement.2° Moran is highly critical of the World Bank's restrictive focus which
looked only at the quality of water in Sipacapa and ignored the larger impact to
surrounding communities.210 In 2006, Madre Selva commissioned Flaviano
Bianchini to take samples of the water, which showed high levels of various
metals that exceed the standards of potable water as established by the World
Bank.21 ' The Guatemalan government claimed that Bianchini's findings were
false, and shortly after, Montana Exploradora filed suit against Madre Selva
while Bianchini received several threats in the weeks that followed. COPAE
conducted a series of periodic tests of water samples in 2007 and published their
findings in October 2008, again finding high concentrations of heavy metals,
particularly arsenic, that exceeded levels authorized by the World Bank.2 1 The
Guatemalan government criticized these studies for lacking scientific
soundness.2 4 The Guatemalan government also suggested conducting joint
studies, but these ventures have not been executed. 21 Additionally, from 2007 to
2009, COPAE and the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee ("UUSC")
conducted an investigation of building damage resulting from the nearby mining
activities, and found that buildings located in the villages near the mine were
more prone to cracks than buildings in the control villages. 26 At the request of

207.
208.
209.
Responses
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

van de Sandt, supranote 27, at 47.
Id.
See Memorandum from Dr. Robert E. Moran on CAO Marlin Mine Assessment: Technical
(Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.saviaguate.org/doc/guatmarlinCAO9-28-05.pdf.
Id.
van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
COPAE & UUSC, supra note 77.
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Archbishop of Guatemala's office, Physicians for Human Rights conducted a
study of Marlin Mine in August 2009."7 Relying on diverse scientific methods
that included an array of samples collected from both human (blood, urine,
survey answers) and environmental (drinking water, river water, sediment and
soil) sources, a three-member research team found evidence of metal
211
contamination related to the mine. In August 2010, an environmental research
nonprofit, E-Tech International, 2'9 also raised concern in a study about the
groundwater and surface water contamination around the mine. 220 Professor Doug
Cassel, who earlier refused to conduct the Goldcorp Human Rights
Assessment,"' more recently, at the request of the Archbishop, agreed to conduct
a separate human rights impact assessment of the situation of the Marlin Mine,
the results of which are still pending.2
For its part, Montana Exploradora submitted environmental impact studies as
a requirement of applying for a mining license in Guatemala and to receiving
loan approval from the World Bank."' Moreover, Montana Exploradora has also
commissioned ongoing environmental studies in response to the several NGOsponsored studies. 2 In 2005, Montana Exploradora created the Asociaci6n de
Monitoreo Ambiental Comunitario ("AMAC"), which carried out its first field
job to collect water samples in 2006.225 In collaboration with technical experts
from San Carlos University, the local samples were sent to a Canadian laboratory
for testing.2 6 The company claims that these tests do not show any
227
of AMAC due
contamination. Local groups have questioned• the• independence
228
Goldcorp
May
2010,
In
Exploradora.
by
Montana
is
employed
to the fact that it
announced the receipt of the final human rights assessment report, prepared at the

217. Basu et al., supra note 49, at 71.
218. Id. at 71, 76 (finding that individuals near the Marlin Mine have higher exposures to some metals
compared to those living farther away and that levels of certain metals were elevated in water and sediment
samples, and that water quality and quantity in the region are of concern).
219. E-TECH INT'L, http://etechinternational.org/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
220. E-TECH INT'L, EVALUATION OF PREDICTED AND ACTUAL WATER QUALITY CONDITIONS AT THE
(Aug. 2010), available at http://www.etechinternational.org/082010
MARLIN MINE, GUATEMALA

guatemala/MarlinReportFinalEnglish.pdf.
221. Maheandiran et al., supra note 129, at 11; Canadian Mine Accused of Causing Skin Infections,
supra note 203.
222. See A Human Rights Impact Assessment of the Marlin Mine, San Miguel Ixtahuacdn, Guatemala,
UNIV. NOTRE DAME L. SCH., http://law.nd.edu/center-for-civil-and-human-rights/independent-international-

panel/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
223. van de Sandt, supra note 27, at 13.
224. See id. at 31.
225. Id. at 31-32.
226. Id. at 32.
227. Id.
228. Id. One former employee has stated that there is no community input into the selection of who
works at AMAC and that he was forced to resign after he became critical of Montana Exploradora. Id.
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request of a group of its shareholders.2 9 The report does not make legal
assessments of the Marlin Mine's past performance, nor was it designed to
suggest the closure of operations. Rather, the report identified areas of concern to
enable Montana Exploradora and Goldcorp to implement modifications to
safeguard human rights. 230 The report acknowledged challenges to
implementation, including limited or reluctant stakeholder participation, as well
as weaknesses in the documentation provided by Montana Exploradora in some
areas.23' Specifically on the issue of the environment, the report concluded that
"independent technical review found that at present, Montana has achieved
performance consistent with good industry standards with regard to most issues
having direct impact on human rights including: air emissions monitoring and
mitigation, dust mitigation, noise mitigation and monitoring, water monitoring..
•, erosion control, and mine and liquid effluent management."23 2 The report also
concluded that there was no evidence that Montana Exploradora had infringed
indigenous group's right to water, except in the need to promote greater
information and dialogue with the community .233 With regard to health-related
problems, the report simply asserted that there was not an apparent increase in
health-related issues, while simultaneously acknowledging insufficient diagnostic
234
capacity to determine the cause of current health problems. The report
identified the following serious concerns only as areas that require improvement:
"disclosure and consultation with communities about health and safety issues,
resolving the controversy over vibration damage to houses, coordinating
emergency response plans with local authorities and civil organizations, and
insufficient provision for closure and post closure monitoring and
maintenance., 23 5 In public documents, Goldcorp only reports that it has posted an
eight million quetzales bond for the closure of the mine.236 In stark contrast, a
recent study conducted by the UUSC of the United States, in collaboration with
COPAE, reported that the closure of the Marlin Mine would cost 389 quetzals,
96 of which would go to treat the contaminated waters. 237

229. See ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANT'S INC., supra note 46, at 4.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 8.
232. Id. at 14.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 15.
235. Id.
at 14.
236. Alberto Ramirez E, Cierre Ticnio de la Mina Marlin, Costaria Q389 Millones, PRENSA LIBRE
(July 28, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.prensalibre.comlnoticias/Cierretecnico-costaria-Q389-millones-0
525547478.html.
237. Id.
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III. LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES AND DEEPER LESSONS FROM
THE MARLIN MINE

The detailed discussion of the Marlin Mine conflict and the ensuing
responses by the affected communities provide the necessary backdrop for
discussing the teaching moments and learning opportunities experienced by
teachers and students alike, who have traveled to Guatemala as part of the InterAmerican program. The program in Guatemala has operated for only three years
and is small. During the past three years, fifteen U.S. and fifteen Guatemalan law
students have participated in the program, all except two with moderate to high
levels of proficiency in the Spanish language. About half of the U.S. students had
traveled to Latin America prior to the program, although only two had spent
more than a few months in the region. None had ever been to Guatemala, and
only one had spent significant time in a country comparable to Guatemala in
terms of its indigenous communities and social inequality (i.e., Ecuador). Thus,
for all the students, the experience proved to be very unique and eye opening, as
well as challenging and difficult. Nine of the fifteen U.S. students would spend a
total of eleven to twelve weeks in the country, not only enrolling in substantive
law classes taught in Spanish but also completing externships with NGOs in
Guatemala City. Two of these externships, CALAS and the Rigoberta Menchd
Foundation, focused on environmental justice issues and the rights of indigenous
communities and offered work on issues arising out of the Marlin Mine situation.
The focus of this essay is primarily on the four students who completed
externships directly related to the Marlin Mine and the indigenous struggles for
environmental justice in Guatemala. However, all fifteen students who traveled
to Guatemala were affected and transformed in some way by this struggle. It is
nearly impossible to arrive in Guatemala, even in Guatemala City or Antigua,
and not recognize the importance of transnational mining for the country. 238 The
issue is even present on the highway billboards, which denounce or praise mining
exploitation in the country, and of course, it is nearly a daily story in the front
page news of the Guatemalan newspaper. One of the student participants once
remarked to me that even the youth who shine shoes in Guatemala seem to know
something about the Marlin Mine.
The program also intentionally strives to develop in students the critical lens
that Bill Hing described during the Hawaii teaching conference, which is a key
precursor to a life of social justice activism. 239 All of the fifteen U.S. students
238. The Inter-American program in Guatemala consists of a three-week bilingual legal program held in
Antigua, Guatemala, where students with some proficiency in the language enroll in substantive law courses
taught in Spanish that are specific to the region or enroll in Legal Spanish and a law course with a Latin
American Comparative legal perspective taught in English. During the program, students also visit the
Guatemalan Congress and the Constitutional Electoral Court, and travel to the highlands in Guatemala where
the largest concentration of Guatemalan Mayans reside.
239. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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enrolled in courses that touched on the tensions between liberalizing trade and
sustainable development in Guatemala; emphasized historical and sociological
studies; or provided political science explanations for Guatemala's most pressing
social problems, including the plight of indigenous communities. In the summer
of 2010, for example, the course titled Derecho Comercial Para Inversionistas
Extranjeros en Guatemala (Commercial Law for Foreign Investors in
Guatemala)m used a hypothetical case throughout the class involving a foreign
investor client seeking, among other things, the possibility of engaging in mining
exploitation in the country. 24' The course on International Trade and
Development in the Americas, taught in English, benefited richly from the
perspectives of Guatemalan law students in the discussion with U.S. students on
"free trade" vs. "free and fair trade," and the exploration of how and whether
U.S.-Latin American bilateral trade agreements have contributed to development
in the region. 24 2 The program also demanded the students' reflection and
engagement with the country. The course titled Derecho de Amdrica Latina
Comparado: El Caso de Guatemala (Comparative Latin American Law: The
Guatemala Case Study), which I taught, required students to write reflective
journal entries that applied what they had learned about Guatemala's difficult
history or its current social problems to what they were experiencing in their
daily living in Guatemala. In the summer of 2010, for example, nine U.S.
students submitted fifty journal entries. Nearly half of them dealt with issues that
directly involved indigenous communities and their struggles for sustainable
development and cultural survival in a globalized economy, in a country still
struggling with democratic transition post-war. Students were thoughtful and
reflective about such topics as corporate social responsibility; the role of a
weakened state; international entities and civil society, including consumers to
improve the plight of Mayans in the country; the potential and challenges of fair
trade in Guatemala; and the struggles to retain traditional weaving in a
competitive global market. This did not surprise me. Despite a bloody thirty-six-

240. See course descriptions at Summer Program in Guatemala, UNIV. OF THE PAC., MCGEORGE SCH. OF
(last
L., http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Acaderic-Programs/International-Study/Sunmer-Proegram-in-Guatemala.htm
visited Oct. 18, 2011) (general information about the program).
241. This course was taught by Professor Enrique Sdnchez Usera, the Director of Private Law at the
Faculty of Juridical and Social Sciences of Universidad Rafael Landivar in Guatemala City. In addition to his
position as an academic, Professor SAnchez, who is originally from Spain, consults with foreign investors who
are doing or are seeking to do business in Guatemala. Professor Sdnchez was very knowledgeable and sensitive
to the tensions around foreign investment, sustainable development, and the rights of indigenous communities
in Guatemala, having lived in the country for over fifteen years.
242. This course was taught by Professor Marjorie Florestal from the University of the Pacific,
McGeorge, School of Law. Originally from Haiti, and having worked significantly in Africa on issues of
sustainable development as Assistant General Counsel in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, as Senior
Legal Advisor to Cape Verde, as a trade lawyer with the U.S. Department of Commerce, and also as a
consultant with the African Development Bank, Professor Florestal brought a keen sensitivity to potential and
limits of liberalizing policies in countries like Guatemala.
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year civil war that tried to annihilate the indigenous "problem" in Guatemala,243
indigenous peoples and their plight are blatantly visible, even in the splendor of
Antigua, Guatemala. Take, for instance, the indigenous street children who flock
to foreigners, demonstrating their merchant English skills in their desperate and
persistent plea to sell their dirt-cheap, hand-made products in the Central Park of
Antigua. Or consider the quickly-changing landscape from millionaire homes in
Antigua, to adobe structures that house dirt-poor indigenous children, who cannot
afford to go to school in the highlands of Guatemala. These images, which were
particularly haunting after our students witnessed the devastation of an entire
indigenous community around Lake Atitlan following the tropical storms, left
lessons that will be hard to forget. 24 One student commented during our difficult
journey back to Antigua from Solold, after being temporarily trapped by road
closures: "Professor Aldana, I know that after this trip I will not be able to simply
ignore Guatemala if the plight of its24people ever makes it to the mainstream U.S.
media. I will have to pay attention.,
A.

The Lessonsfrom the Marlin Mine

Guatemalan indigenous struggles with transnational mining, and especially
the Marlin Mine, offered a few of our students the opportunity for even deeper
learning. The learning opportunities were plentiful, frustrating at times,
challenging, fearful, and full of mixed emotions of hope and despair, as well as
faith and cynicism. In general, their involvement uncovered a grassroots activism
and a bottom-up movement of resistance, largely dependent on transnational and
international legal norms and strategies that failed to provide a satisfactory
remedy to the community.246 Students experienced, for example, how the

confusion of legal norms and the decentralization of accountability through the
development of so many new and overlapping laws and institutions to address
transnational problems were, unfortunately, adding up to less than the sum of its
parts in this struggle. Already a group of scholars have thoughtfully examined the
failed promise of ILO 169, the Inter-American System litigation, accountability
mechanisms in International Financial Institutions (namely the World Bank), and
of corporate social responsibility norms in this struggle. 247 Perceptively, these
243. See COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, GUATEMALA MEMORY OF SILENCE, available
at http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/conc 1.html.
244. For a story about the tropical storm experience by the students, see Law Students Bear Witness to
Devastation in Guatemala, UNIV. OF THE PAC., MCGEORGE SCH. OF L. (June 10, 2010), http://www.
mcgeorge.edu/NewsroonNewsArchive/2010_NewsArchives/LawStudentsBearWitness
To Devastation
_inGuatemala.htm.
245. Interview with Roberto Contreras, 2011 J.D. candidate, Penn. State School of Law, in Sololi, Guat.
Statement made in Spanish and translated by the author.
246. For a perceptive description of this bottom-up grassroots resistance and an assessment of its limits,
see Fulmer et al., supra note 136; Imai et al., supra note 27, at 129-3 1.
247. Fulmer et al., supra note 136, at 10 1-12.
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scholars noted, inter alia, the dependence of these various strategies and norms
on stronger domestic laws and legal institutions, which are sorely lacking in
Guatemala.24 Indeed, through their projects, some of our students would
experience first-hand the weaknesses of Guatemala's legal institutions; worse
yet, Guatemala's political unwillingness to take indigenous peoples' struggles
against the Marlin Mine seriously, even targeting those who protest against it or
failing to protect those made vulnerable by their activism. Our students would
also be asked to focus, then, on transnational or international mechanisms for
accountability, including exploring the possibility within CAFTA or pushing for
corporate social responsibility in Canada. Here, they would unfortunately
uncover similar lessons: nations are unwilling to add teeth to corporate social
responsibility, preferring instead to insist on voluntary corporate compliance,
which is all the more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in a country like
Guatemala.
Before delving more specifically into the students' involvement in the Marlin
Mine struggles and lessons learned, the following context is necessary. Safety
considerations kept our students away from the Marlin Mine and from the
communities directly affected by the activities there. This was unfortunate, but
when we first began working with local NGOs in 2008, the tensions in the
community were high. Protesters of the mine have received death threats from
unknown individuals for their support of indigenous communities, and several
protesters and residents were facing criminal prosecutions for resisting the
mine. 2 9 As a previous human rights lawyer who has worked and lived for a short
period of time in Guatemala, I had a good sense of the risks involved in a
program like ours. The program takes student safety very seriously, and it meant
that we insisted on students living in very safe communities of Guatemala,
traveling with a private driver, and not traveling outside of Guatemala City
without our accompaniment (except with guided tours for tourism purposes in
safe areas of Guatemala), and not to areas where tensions were high. 50 Thus, the
work of our students involved principally legal research, conducted in Guatemala
City. All of them, however, had opportunities to attend forums on some of these
issues (attended by community leaders in the City), to meet with government
officials, or to attend meetings in Congress to lobby for change. All of these
experiences were invaluable to their learning.
The student projects related to the Marlin Mine included the creation of four
legal guides explaining and making recommendations on the use of domestic or
248. Id. at 102-03 (discussing Guatemala's failure to implement ILO 169, despite ratification); id. at 110
(concluding that the World Bank's oversight and accountability mechanisms over the Marlin Mine failed
because it unduly relied on Guatemala's poor assessment of the Company's project, rather than conducting its
own meaningful on the ground review of the project).
249. Maheandiran, supra note 129, at 5-7.
250. This piece is not focused on safety. However, we have thought a lot about this issue and would be
happy to share any and all materials and best practices we have developed in this regard.
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international strategies for environmental justice accountability. Two guides
focused on transnational or international mechanisms of accountability: one
guide looked at the mechanism under CAFTA's environmental chapter for filing
civil society complaints; the other assessed the challenges and opportunities for
filing a complaint against mining activities in Canada. The other two guides
examined opportunities for remedies under Guatemala's domestic mining laws.
The first looked at provisions for seeking suspension of a mining exploitation
license under Guatemala's mining laws on the basis of irreparable harm. The
second examined the case law precedent for how and when the Guatemalan
government had imposed criminal sanctions for environmental justice violations.
Below, I describe the deeper legal lessons that resulted from this work for our
students and what it teaches us about social justice struggles of indigenous
communities in the context of globalization. Moreover, I share a few of the
invaluable inter-cultural and social justice lawyering lessons that would impact
our students.
B, Lessons on Law's Potentialfor Social Change
1. Guatemala'sEnvironmental Justice Norms and Legal Institutions
Two students closely examined Guatemala's environmental laws to explore
domestic possibilities for legal remedies arising out of the Marlin Mine dispute.
As a legal research exercise, the experience would prove extremely frustrating.
As a lesson about the law's limits, the experience was deeply illuminating.
The first project looked specifically at Article 51 (a) of Guatemala's Mining
Law (Decree 48-97), which contemplates the suspension of a mining exploitation
license in cases involving imminent harm to life or property. 5' The Rigoberta
Mencht Foundation was interested in a guide that would explain how such a
remedy could be sought in Guatemala and what standard would apply to the
definition of "imminent harm." The student approached the project naively, the
way he would have approached a similar research project in the United States.
His initial instinct, in fact, was to ask me about searching Guatemalan case law
interpreting the provision. The student's mistake went beyond the typical error of
importing common law systems traditions into a civil law system. The student
assumed too much. While he was never able to ascertain this fact definitively, it
did not appear that, in 2009, Guatemala's Mining Ministry had ever implemented
or awarded an Article 51 remedy. Unfortunately, the student was not even able to

251. Ley de Minerfa de Guatemala y su Reglamento Decreto N' 48-97 y Acuerdo Gubernativo 1762001 de las leyes de Guatemala [Mining Law of Guatemala and its Regulation], at art. 51, available at
http://www.mem.gob.gt/Portal/MEMDocuments/DGM/Ley/ey%20de%20mineria%20y%20su%2Oreglamento.
pdf.
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confirm whether an Article 51 petition for suspension has ever been requested.252
The student's outreach to the Mining Ministry and to several Guatemalan NGOs
that might have pursued such a remedy never yielded clear answers. For
example, in a series of e-mail exchanges with the agency, the student was told by
the Mining Ministry that Article 51 findings were not made public, nor could the
student find evidence of a case in Guatemalan courts appealing an administrative
denial. 25' All the student received as guidance from the Mining Ministry was a
referral to the Mining Law, sent to the student in English, and a suggestion that
the student look at Guatemala's Administrative Code.5 4 Yet, the statutory
research proved equally limiting to clarify substance or procedures. Article 5 1(a)
of the Mining Law contained no definition of irreparable harm, for example."'
Moreover, Article 51 begins with the language, "subject to verification," the
[Mining] Ministry shall order a mining license concession, without specifying
whether Article 51 created a mandate to verify this and what substantive and
procedural norms would be implicated in the verification process. 6 The rest of
the Mining Law provided no additional guidance on this. The Mining Ministry
confirmed to the student that neither the Mining Law, its implementing
regulations, nor any other law specified the norms or procedures to be followed
for this verification process. Thus, the agency interpretation, at least as
communicated to the student, was that the agency could verify any allegation
informally and anonymously. 257 In light of this, the student's guide consisted of
explaining as best as possible, by relying on the Administrative Procedure Code,
what steps the Menchti Foundation would need to follow to seek the suspension
of an exploitation mining license in Guatemala. 258 To provide guidance on the
type of evidence that the Menchd Foundation would need to put together to
present a strong case of irreparable harm, the student looked principally at cases
with similar facts (i.e. indigenous communities affected by development
activities in their land) in which the Inter-American Court and Commission on
Human Rights has granted precautionary measures. The student discovered, in
fact, that the evidentiary threshold before the Court and Commission was high,

252. For me, it was not until researching for this paper that I discovered that a mining suspension had
been requested back in 2003 by the local communities affected by the Marlin Mine. See supra note 128 and
accompanying text.
253. Manual para La Fundaci6n Rigoberta Mencht sobre la Explotaci6n Minera en la Comunidad de
San Marcos (July 30, 2009) thereinafter Manual sobre la Explotaci6n Minera] (on file with author).
254. Ley de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Sus Reformas de Guatemala Decreto 119-96
[Administrative Litigation Law and its Reform in Guatemala], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/534608/
DECRETO-NUMERO-1 1996-LEY-DE-LO-CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVO-y-sus-Reformas.
255. See Ley de Minerfa de Guatemala y su Reglamento, supra note 251.
256. See id.
257. Manual sobre la Explotaci6n Minera, supra note 253, at Part II.
258. Article 59 of the Mining Law states that the Administrative Procedure Code may be used to seek
resolutions with the Mining Ministry. Id.
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requiring not mere allegations but actual evidence of facts that pointed to the
likelihood of irreparable harm.259
The student understood the limited utility of his guide to the Menchd
Foundation. One issue he raised, having spent by then about eight weeks with the
Foundation, was how the Menchii Foundation could gather this type of evidence
regarding irreparable harm in the affected communities given its limited
resources. The student's initial reaction was to assert that the Foundation need
not concern itself with this as it was the responsibility of the Guatemalan
government to verify the allegations made by the Menchil Foundation in an
Article 51 complaint. This reaction indicated to me that the student needed to be
better informed about the Guatemalan government's position with regard to the
Marlin mining activities. The student, therefore, added Part I to the Guide, which
included a discussion of publically available reports produced by the Mining
Ministry related to the Marlin Mine.26° In this section, the student conceded that
the. Mining Ministry's report of the mining activities from 2008 to 2009
completely contradicted the allegations made by the Menchfi Foundation about
the effect of the mine on the health and property of local residents. 26' The student
noted that the government cites exclusively to environmental studies conducted
by the Montana Exploradora-sponsored environmental monitoring team, AMAC,
while ignoring other studies, including one completed by Robert Moran, which
was referenced several times by international NGOs.262
In several conversations with the student during the project, I recall his
frustration over the results of this guide. It was not clear to him how and whether
the Mencht Foundation intended to pursue an Article 51 remedy, which also left
him wondering why he needed to produce a guide in the first place. We had
conversations about the fact that, even if the strategy was to pursue an
international human rights case, local remedies in Guatemala needed to be
exhausted. I asked the student to consider, as well, whether it generally would be
good practice for civil society to bypass local legal institutions, however unlikely
the odds of success there, and replace them automatically with international
mechanisms. The student acknowledged the benefits of pushing for change
domestically. This prompted the student to seek to strengthen the facts available
to the Foundation. While he did not complete this part of the project, he tried to
contact a few Canadian environmental NGOs, to prompt them to come and
conduct environmental impact studies in the region. I appreciated his dedication
and let him explore. The postscript, of course, is that many such environmental
impact assessment studies have since been conducted of the mine. Unfortunately,
however, these studies have not resolved the political, legal or social tensions

259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at pt. IfI.
Id. at pt. I.
Id.
Id. at pt. 1.3.
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around this mining project.2 63 Nonetheless, the student had learned an invaluable
lesson about the need to understand law contextually, taking into account not
only the potential weaknesses of legal institutions but the political forces that
dictated action or inaction in a given case. Legal analysis is often only the
starting place. This is not a lesson that law professors get to explore in a
traditional law school classroom as often or as effectively as can occur when
learning is contextual and experiential.
The second student who engaged Guatemala's domestic laws was asked to
create a jurisprudential guide of cases in which the Guatemalan government had
imposed penal sanctions for environmental justice violations. It took the student
nearly two months to be able to get his hands on seventeen case decisions.
During this entire time, I experienced his growing frustration in his journal
entries and over e-mail and phone communications, as he described having to
travel from agency to agency, and from law office to office, collecting judgments
(including, in a few instances, to remote areas of Guatemala). The student also
recognized that he only had access to these few judgments based on the deep
networking connections enjoyed by CALAS, the NGO with which he worked.
The lawyers who provided the opinions were friends and law colleagues of some
of the lawyers in CALAS. The fact that the student was able to get his hands on
the opinions revealed a culture of professional favors that at once fascinated and
bothered the student. The student reflected on the value of Westlaw or Lexis and
lamented more than once how the absence of technology and information kept
Guatemala's legal development backwards. He wrote about the lack of access to
information as a way to control knowledge, and with it democratic development
and progress. He also reflected about nepotism and networking in Guatemala and
suggested that it could be both good and bad. The student's observations were
perceptive, even if colored by his own legal culture. For one, I insisted to the
student that our fixation with judgments revealed our roots in common law and
Guatemala's roots in a civil law system. I suggested to the student that rather
than wait for the opinions, his guide should start with a comprehensive
explanation of what environmental violations had been typified as crimes in
Guatemala. The student resisted this part of the assignment. I can only guess at
perhaps his unfamiliarity with statutes and statutory research; but perhaps it was
also that CALAS was looking for a jurisprudential analysis, a rarity in the
country, as well as statistical analysis of what the judgments revealed about the
Code's implementation. As to the student's perceptions on the value of "who you
know" in Guatemala, the student was not wrong about Guatemala, but I also
challenged him to consider whether this similar culture was truly a thing of the
past in the United States. The issue is not as present in the United States, given
prohibitions on ex parte communicationS 6 in the courts and the public's greater
263.
264.

See Manual sobre la Explotaci6n Minera, supra note 253, at pt. I.D.
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access to published opinions. It is more evident, however, in the legislative
process, through the participation of lobbyists and powerful interest-groups who
rely on power and networking to influence law. 265 My point in doing this with the
student was simply to encourage greater self-awareness about the limits of our
own legal system and to discourage over-projections of superiority over other
nations confronting similar challenges to democratic governance and
transparency.
In the end, even with very limited data, the student made some interesting
and useful findings. In addition to the seventeen cases the student was able to
find and digest, the student examined some statistics provided by the Attorney
General's Office [Ministerio Ptdblico] pertaining to crimes against the
environment in the years 2007-2010.266 Based on this, the student was able to
conclude that there is a great gap (of one to thirty-two in 2008) in the number of
complaints received versus judgments rendered in the area of environmental
justice crimes. 67 The student also discovered backlogs and, at least in the cases
examined, a tendency toward very lenient sentences, resulting mostly in nominal
fines and hardly ever in incarceration.2 Moreover, the cases examined revealed
that those targeted have been principally poor residents engaged in illegal
practices for survival, including deforestation. 269 Unfortunately, the guide is not
sufficiently exhaustive in its statutory analysis and is limited to too few cases to
draw broader conclusions about the availability of criminal sanctions related to
mining against multinational executives. For example, cases against Montana
Exploradora were not included in the guide, as they were dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence of environmental contamination.27 0 Still, the guide taught the
student invaluable lessons about the benefits of transparency in legal systems and
the importance of the availability of case law beyond its precedential value, as a
revelation of implementation weaknesses of statutes. CALAS was probably less
interested in the guide to file a case; rather CALAS, which often pushes for
legislative reform, probably wanted to document the limitations of existing
statutes to protect the environment. Unfortunately, in the traditional classroom,
we teach cases to our students primarily to illustrate doctrines; contextual and
experiential learning opportunities help students identify patterns and data that
can be helpful to push for legislative reform. Of course, this student will probably
never underestimate the revolutionary role that Westlaw and Lexis have in

265. Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participationin Rule Making: A Decade
of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADM. RES. THEORY 353-70 (2005).
266. Untitled student project for CALAS examining Guatemala's criminal environmental law cases
(Summer 2010) (on file with author).
267.

Id. at 5.

268.
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Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.

270. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing Guatemala's domestic complaints
related to the Marlin Mine).
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strengthening our own legal system, not solely because it provides a tool for
litigators in a given case, but also because it is a database of empirical richness,
useful to legal reformist thinkers who want to push for systemic changes to
improve social justice.
2. Seeking CorporateSocial Responsibility
Many legal scholars have lamented the limits of law to impose corporate
social responsibility, faulting, in particular, the non-compulsory nature of many
norms seeking to regulate the activities of multinationals, the overreliance on the
strength of domestic legal systems where multinationals operate to achieve
compliance, and the weaknesses of the liberalizing regimes to sufficiently
regulate foreign investment or trade for environmental compliance. 21' The two
students who worked on projects related to seeking corporate social
responsibility would affirm some of these same lessons for Guatemala.
The first student prepared a guide at CALAS's request to examine the
procedures and viability of filing civil society complaints for environmental
harms under Chapter 17 of the CAFTA-DR.272 CALAS did not ask that the
student prepare this guide on the basis of any specific conflict; however, its
lessons on corporate social responsibility have application to the Marlin Mine
conflict as well. The student completed this project in 2009, when only one case
273
had been filed against the Dominican Republic under CAFTA's provisions.
Thus, the student relied on a comparative analysis of similar provisions under the
NAFTA and other free trade agreements ("FTAs") in the Americas, to explain
the likely interpretation and viability of Chapter 17 complaints. The purpose of
this discussion is not to update the guide or elaborate on its technicalities; rather,
it is to highlight some of the broader lessons the student learned about the
limitations of environmental justice accountability in regional trade agreements.
Before embarking on this project, in her first summer of law school, the student
had never engaged in the study of trade agreements, and her exposure to a
complex subject for the first time was incredibly enriched through seeing what

271. See generally EVARISTUS OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: AN AFRICAN CASE STUDY (2009).
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template/nuevo-registro-publico-de-comunicaciones/2007/83 (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).

2011 / The Power of Teaching Social Justice Struggles in Context
was occurring in Guatemala, as related to the environmental issues in the
country, including in the Marlin Mine. Through that lens, the student
immediately understood the significance of the fact that complaints against
Chapter 17 could only be filed against states for non-compliance in the effective
application of domestic environmental laws, rather than involve suits directly
against the multinational.274 While the student was drafting the guide, she
attended congressional hearings and lobbying efforts by CALAS to discuss the
weaknesses in Guatemala's environmental laws and, in particular, their
implementation.2 75 As a result, the student wondered whether mere
recommendations from CAFTA's Secretariat on Environmental Matter would
really make any difference in Guatemala. A study of NAFT'A civil society
complaints offered a glimpse into other challenges that would make the CAFTA
mechanism less than desirable for seeking corporate compliance in the Marlin
Mine. 276 For one, NAFTA environmental cases revealed that complaints had been
few, perhaps in part due to the difficulty of the process; that even fewer resulted
in a case being opened; that the process had been slow; and that procedural
requirements, such as exhaustion of local remedies, made very few cases ripe for
adjudication. 7 I recall the moment when the student informed me that she
worried a lot about the strict application of an exhaustion of local remedy
requirement, especially when she had been comparing notes with the student
who, at the same time, was writing about Guatemala's administrative
proceedings to seek suspension of a mining license. I doubt the student would
have captured this profound realization so well and so quickly had we been
studying CAFTA's Chapter 17 solely in the classroom. Also, the student's guide
asserts several times that the procedures are so complex that only a few
organizations, such as CALAS, would probably know how to access the process.
Nearly three years since the student prepared the guide, her predictions have
proved almost prophetic. Only seven complaints have been filed under CAFTADR to date, three of which are against the Guatemalan government, including one
presented by CALAS. 7 s None, however, relate to the Marlin Mine situation.
The second student prepared a guide more directly related to the potential for
transnational litigation against Goldcorp for Montana Exploradora's mining
activities in Guatemala. The student prepared a thirty-five page, singled-space

274. Article 17.7 of CAFTA provides that "[a]ny person of a Party may file a submission asserting that a
Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws. Such submissions shall be filed with a secretariat
or other appropriate body ("secretariat") that the Parties designate." CAFTA-DR, supra note 272, at art. 17.7.
275. For a thoughtful discussion of environmental justice legal institutions in Guatemala, see generally
Susan A. Berger, Environmentalism in Guatemala:When Fish Have Ears, 32 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 99 (1997).
276. See H. Hamner Hill, NAFTA and Environmental Protection: The First 10 Years, 2006 J. INST.
JUST. & INT'L STUD. 157 (2006).
277. See generally id.
278. Registro de Comunicaciones, SECRETARIA DE ASUNTOS AMBIENTALES, http://www.saasem.org/index.php/gtltemplate/nuevo-registro-publico-de-comunicaciones/2011 (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
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guide discussing very complicated doctrines of forum non conveniens and the
liability of the parent company for the acts of its subsidiaries. 279 Aside from
learning about the extreme complexity in this area of law, this particular student
was also transformed in thinking about social corporate responsibility. First, with
close connections to Canada (his fianc6e is Canadian), the student questioned his
own preconceptions of Canadian attitudes toward sustainable development and
socially responsible investment in foreign countries.28 Through this project and
the example of the Marlin Mine, the student would discover Canada's struggles
to put teeth into corporate social responsibility through the efforts of shareholders
and Parliament. This particular student put a great deal of faith in consumer and
shareholder accountability to improve issues of labor and environmental justice
compliance in developing nations. In fact, he envisioned himself considering a
career in corporate law, ideally to promote best social norms practices. He was
very much drawn to projects related to fair trade. I very much hope that this
student continues to pursue his laudable career interests. This student now,
however, has a greater appreciation for the limits of solely voluntary norms or
consumer-driven accountability to improve social justice conditions in
developing nations. This realization did not come from the legal lessons learned
through the project. The project certainly taught him a lot of law regarding
significant defenses available to multinationals against transnational litigation.
He also learned that Canada is even further behind than the United States in
permitting suits to be brought against Canadian companies in Canadian courts.'
But it was working on this issue, while completing an externship with the
Menchii Foundation, that showed the student a human face to the struggle; and
with that, I think, greater conviction that corporate responsibility must go beyond
models of voluntary compliance in cases where people's struggles can be
undermined based on their vulnerable status as indigenous communities.
C. Lessons on the Possibilitiesof Social Justice Lawyering
I do not think a single student who has participated in the Guatemala project
has walked away without feeling proud of the legal profession and the role that
lawyers play in promoting social change. For many of our students, this was a
unique and rare gift. The cynicism against lawyers and the disrespect for the legal
profession in popular culture can make law students forget the heroism, dignity,
and worth of lawyers needed to create significant change in the lives of
279. Projecto Final, Pasantia 2010, Fundaci6n Rigoberta Menchdl (Sept. 2010) (on file with author).
280. For accounts of the government of Canada's political and economic interest in Latin America
starting in the 1980s, see generally Peter McKenna, Canada's Policy Towards Latin America: A Statist
Interpretation, 49 INT'L J. 929 (1994); George W. Schuyler, Perspectives on Canada and Latin America:
Changing Context... Changing Policy?, 33 J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 19 (1991).

281. Imai et al., supra note 27, at 134-36 (discussing challenges to establishing jurisdiction in Canadian
courts to sue Goldcorp for mining in Guatemala).
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individuals and to improve society. In Guatemala, however, the intractable
problems that society faces. 2 made many of our students wonder why lawyers
stayed; why they woke up every day to create change; why they did not give up.
This was especially true of the students who worked with the environmental
justice NGOs that taught our students so much about the courage and dignity of
our profession. Through the experience, some would also discover their own
courage and their profound humanity to connect very deeply with people so
different from themselves.
1. Courage
One recurring theme for lawyers who fight for social change in Guatemala is
their safety. One incident that hit closest to home for our students was the attack
in September 2008 against Dr. Yuri Melini, the head of CALAS.283 Dr. Melini
"was shot seven times in his stomach and legs on a Guatemala City street"
shortly after CALAS won the constitutionality challenge against Guatemala's
mining law.2M Dr. Melini believed that his attack has something to do with his
stance against mining given the timing of the attack, although the crime has not
been investigated conclusively. 285 Thankfully, Dr. Melini survived and is
currently doing well, and improving every day. But when we first met him, a
year after the attack, he was still on crutches and traveling with bodyguards.
It is impossible to meet Dr. Melini and not be transformed by him. A man of
small stature, his presence is as large as his conviction over the struggle for
environmental justice in Guatemala.28 6 For him, it began early, as a teenager; he
studied medicine, not law, to please his parents. But his love of nature drew him
to activism, and all his work is related to the use of law and legal institutions to
push for change in his native Guatemala, a country he is literally willing to die
for.287 In the process of deciding to work with CALAS, our students would
discover their own courage as lawyers. As Director of the Inter-American
program, I was open with my students and with my school about the incident.
The two students who chose to work in CALAS included a female and a male
student in their early twenties. They were not unduly dismissive of the dangers,
282. Guatemala: Country BackgroundInformation, GLOBAL YOUTH CONNECT, http://www.globalyouth
connect.org/country-guatemala.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
283. Guatemala: Threats Against Human Rights Defenders Dr. Yuri GiovanniMelini Salguero and Mr.
Pedro Rafael
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but were very thoughtful about the assessment of safety, risk, and their
commitment to work on these issues. Ultimately, they acknowledged that there
was a risk, but that it would be mitigated by their status as U.S. citizens, their low
profile in the organization and project, and the safety precautions they would be
required to take while in Guatemala. While I shared this assessment, I still very
much admired the students' courage and determination.
2.

Dignity and Perseverance

In our comparative law class on Guatemala, given Guatemala's long and
terrible history of repression against indigenous communities,28 9 we inevitably
spent a great deal of time discussing the victimization of indigenous
communities. And as much as I repeatedly reminded students that Guatemalan
Mayans are proud and dignified peoples, they have been through the shared
spaces with indigenous professionals that some of our students have also been
transformed by. All of our students who worked in Guatemala with NGOs had
the opportunity to meet indigenous lawyers in the country, but the Menchd
Foundation has been the richest of these experiences. I observed this especially in
the guided reflections from the two students who worked in the Menchdi
Foundation and who became good friends with the people they worked with. One
student spoke of dignity and perseverance as characteristics he observed and
admired in his dealings with Mayan lawyers and other community leaders. These
are lessons I could never have taught my students in the classroom.
IV. CONCLUSION
The day before we left Waikiki, we visited a local craft store where we
would find authentic native products from the island. I admit to being shocked at
how expensive the beautiful craft pieces were and could not help but compare
them to the inexpensive cost of equally beautiful crafts in Guatemala. The
socially-minded spirit in me wanted to do the right thing. So I bought a few
things in the store, although the critical scholar in me made me wonder if any of
it made any difference in the life of the artist who had crafted the piece. I did,
moreover, buy one CD. You have probably heard of the artist, Israel "IZ"
Kamakawiwo'ole, and if not the artist, certainly his rendition of the song "Over
the Rainbow. ' ' 290 If you have not heard it, you should. It is so melodious and
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sweet, it sends chills down your spine. I had not realized until then that he was
Native Hawaiian, although I had heard his Hollywood-famed voice. 9' Somehow,
IZ transformed this song for me, to give it meaning, and it reminded me of the
powerful lesson that my U.S. students taught me in Guatemala. It was one
student in particular who said to me, "Professor Aldana, we are learning a lot in
your class and we appreciate what you are doing, but we are depressed. Can we
please talk about what is positive about Guatemala and its people?" So I want to
leave you with the lyrics of this song and a few positive reflections about this
mining struggle that are intended not to make light of the issue, but rather to take
to heart the lesson from my student:
Social justice struggles need hope.
Somewhere over the rainbow
Way up high,
And the dreams that you dream of
Once in a lullaby.
Somewhere over the rainbow
Bluebirdsfly,
And the dreams that you dream of
Dreams really do come true.
Someday I'll wish upon a star
And wake up where the clouds arefar behindme.
Where troubles melt like lemon drops
High above the chimney tops
That's where you'll find me.
Somewhere over the rainbow
Bluebirdsfly.
And the dreams that you dare to
Oh why, oh why can't I?
So in honor of IZ, who passed away in 1997,92 I close with the following
observations. The success of nearly 800,000 "No" votes against the mine cannot
be captured in a simple legal story of the failures of ILO 169.293 Rather, let's look
at what it said about a social movement among indigenous communities to stand
up to defend their lands and resources. Let's also consider the cohesiveness of the
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purpose that this struggle has brought to the local communities, to reaffirm their
desire for communal land ownership, and to consider alternatives to sustainable
development. Let's hope and collectively support the efforts for fair trade in
Guatemala. Let's praise the efforts of a few Canadian shareholders to give
meaning to corporate social responsibility. Let me also celebrate the courage of
our students, and the transformation that happened in each of them from this
experience. Let me honor the incredible experience of my own transformation as
a teacher, as a lawyer, and as a person, each time I make my way back to
Guatemala.

